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With the legislative review of police oversight currently taking place in South Africa, now is a good time
to reflect on the regulation of the private security industry. This article does so by focusing on three
challenges to the current private security regulatory systems: the increased pluralisation of policing within
public spaces; the operation of hidden sectors within the industry; and the nature of criminal abuses
perpetuated by the industry. We do this to demonstrate the need for a re-imagining of what regulation,
especially state regulation, of this industry should entail. The aim of the article is not to review the
current legislation or to identify gaps and propose means of filling those gaps, but rather to reflect on the
underlying premises informing the legislation and propose a shift in thinking. We do this by briefly
identifying two phases of state regulation in South Africa, implemented before and after the change to a
new democratic dispensation, and suggest that we are now entering a third phase of regulation. We
conclude with suggestions as to what this third phase may entail.  
THE NATURE OF PRIVATE 
SECURITY IN SOUTH AFRICA
The private security industry in South Africa is of
interest to academics and policy-makers the world
over, for a variety of reasons. It is believed to be
the largest in the world in terms of its contrib-
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ution to the country’s GDP (Gross Domestic
Product) – approximately 2% of the total GDP of
the country – and had an estimated annual
turnover of approximately R40 billion in 2007 and
R50 billion in 2008.1 The industry has grown
exponentially for the past few decades, both in
terms of numbers of guards and numbers of
companies (Figures 1 and 2).2
A significant proportion of the industry is armed
– which is not necessarily the case in other
countries (for instance Sierra Leone and Nigeria).3
Arguably, the guarding staff of private security
companies in South Africa are confronted with
violent situations that private security guards in
many other countries would never have to
confront, at least not on a regular basis. The
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industry also undertakes a range of sometimes
overlapping activities, and performs functions
both within and outside the purview of the state,
as set out in Figure 3.
In light of this, South Africa may be a natural site
for issues of regulation to be both challenged and
developed.  
South Africa has a very comprehensive set of laws
for regulating the industry;4 so much so that
countries like Kenya and Uganda are modelling
their regulatory framework on the South African
laws – at least on paper.5 Yet there are still
challenges to ensuring that the industry operates
professionally, constitutionally and to a high
standard.6 These challenges include, but are not
limited to, ineffective implementation of the
legislation. This leads us to challenge the
underlying ways of thinking or ‘mentalities’ that
have informed private security regulation in
South Africa.7 In doing so we firstly explore what
is meant by regulation; we secondly outline what
we think of as the first two phases of state
regulation in South Africa; and then propose a
third phase through highlighting three
developments that challenge prevailing
mentalities and practices. In conclusion we reflect
on how these developments force one to re-think
or re-imagine how some aspects of regulation
could work in South Africa. 
REGULATING WHAT? TWO PHASES
OF STATE REGULATION
When speaking of regulation one is actually
speaking of systems of control and accountability.8
Regulation is something usually requiring norms
or rules that are enforced by some party in an
attempt to shape the behaviour of others, and
then to hold them to account (or to be
answerable) for that behaviour.9 In this article we
conceive of regulation as including non-state
regulation. We use Julia Black’s definition of
regulation as something that can come from a
variety of directions and sources, it ‘occurs in
many locations, in many fora’, and it is a ‘product
of interactions’ rather than exclusively formal,
top-down or legal (state) control.10 In other words,
Figure 2: Number of active registered security
businesses in South Africa 2005-2010 
Source: PSIRA
Figure 3: Security services offered in South Africa
as at 2005 
Source: PSIRA
Figure 1: Number of active and inactive registered
security offices in South Africa 2005-2010
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regulation can be undertaken by both state and
non-state actors (such as clients, the public, private
businesses, private security companies and so
forth).11 However, a great deal can be learnt about
the underlying theory, rationale or goal by
reviewing systems of state regulation, as set out
below. We argue that there have been two
(overlapping) phases of state regulation of the
industry since the 1980s.12
First phase
The first phase – apartheid-era regulation –
reflected the nature of the relationship that the
state had with the industry at the time. The first
law, the Security Officers Act, was passed in
October 1987 and was enacted primarily to create
a Security Officers’ Board. The Board was essen-
tially created to ensure that security companies,
employers and employees would register with it
(with certificates issued to that effect), and it
decided who could qualify to be registered or not.13
The state sought to involve the industry both
directly and indirectly in policing activities. For
instance, the National Key Points Act granted
security personnel guarding key points (such as
fuel plants and military bases) powers of arrest and
search and seizure.14 In many instances, the
security of strategic facilities was undertaken by
private security companies, and thus the industry
was forced to professionalise.15 The system of
regulation created during this time was aimed at
achieving professionalisation through ‘state-
enforced self-regulation’.16
In distinguishing between the first phase of
regulation and the second, it could be argued that
the 1987 law was intended to protect the interests
of the industry, whereas laws that were passed
later, during phase two, were intended to protect
the interests of the public. That would explain why
newer legislation takes a more punitive and
exclusionary stance with respect to the treatment
of the industry by the government.17
Second phase
The second phase of security regulation correspon-
ded with political change. There was also a need to
address loopholes in the Security Officers Act
(1987), such as, for instance, the exclusion of the
in-house sector in its regulatory mandate; and the
presence of industry representatives on the
Security Officers’ Board, which rendered the
Board subject to vested interests. This resulted in
the Security Officers Amendment Acts of 1992,
1996 and 1997 and the Private Security Industry
Regulation Act of 2001 and other supporting
legislation.18 With the change to a democracy, the
changed nature of relations between the state and
the industry resulted in different regulatory goals,
i.e. the protection of labour rights and of the
public. This shift reflected the changed nature of
the relationship between the state and the
industry, from industry being viewed as an ally of
the state to a potential threat. 
This article argues that the time is ripe to enter a
third phase of regulation.19 We support this
contention by outlining three challenges we
believe are not adequately addressed by current
systems of state regulation: the increasing
pluralisation of policing; the operations of hidden
sectors of the industry; and the actual (and
potential) criminal abuses arising from the
industry.20
THREE CHALLENGES TO 
STATE REGULATION
Pluralisation
A claim often made when talking about private
security is the fact that ‘it is now almost impossible
to identify any function or responsibility of the
public police that is not, somewhere and under
some circumstances, assumed and performed by
private police in democratic societies’.21 This is
especially true for South Africa. Of the many
activities the private security industry performs,
the movement into public spaces and the policing
thereof is surely one of the most controversial. In
recent years there has been an increased
pluralisation of policing in what are considered to
be public spaces. Pluralisation entails the
increasing involvement and diversity of non-state
(and state) entities in conventional policing
activities. There are a number of causes and
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drivers for this development that are not discussed
here. However, it is important to note the changing
nature of spaces and the power afforded to private
security in these spaces. In relation to the changing
nature of spaces, a blurring of public and private
space is observable, such that private spaces take
on aspects of public-ness through being open to
the public and having a public feel (mass private
property such as sports stadia, shopping malls and
so forth). On the other hand certain public spaces
increasingly adopt a private feel, as, although
accessible to the public, a private system of
ordering operates alongside the state system (City
Improvement Districts, gated communities and so
forth).22
Private security operating in private space derives
considerable power through contract and property
law. Private security operating in public space
derives considerable power (both symbolic and
legal) through, for instance, laws such as the
Criminal Procedure Act and/or through sheer
numbers, resources and technologies at its
disposal), which enables it to work alongside the
state police and do very similar things to the state
police. This movement into public space
necessarily means that at various points state and
private security share the same spaces. Research
has shown that one of three things happen:
cooperation, hostility or co-existence.23
Where it results in cooperation (which has been
the case in many settings in South Africa),
complex state and non-state relationships may
develop, and interesting questions begin to form,24
such as who is responsible for what? Who is to be
held accountable should something go wrong?
Who is meant to ensure an alignment to
constitutionality, human rights and professional
practice? Thus increasing pluralisation of policing
may result in the ‘problem of many hands… where
so many people contribute that no one
contribution can be identified; and if no one
person can be held accountable after the event,
then no one needs to behave responsibly
beforehand.’25
The more complex the network becomes, and
where authority, resources, knowledge and skills
are shared, the more difficult it is to hold
individual policing organisations to account.
Currently there is no normative framework
through which all those groupings and institutions
involved in policing can be guided in their
engagement with each other, especially with respect
to the types of functions that the private sector is
legally permitted to perform.26 In addition, existing
regulatory bodies responsible for oversight of the
private security industry on the one hand and the
police on the other, tend to operate in silos and
thus may not be able to address challenges arising
from collaboration between state and non-state
policing institutions.27
Hidden sectors
In addition to the abovementioned shortcomings,
existing legislation does not refer to what we refer
to as ‘in-house’ security. In-house security consists
of a company making use of its own security
operations, personnel and equipment to protect its
interests.28 Nowhere does existing legislation
provide a framework for regulating the activities of
‘contract security’ companies.29 Contract security
companies provide a range of services: they may
head a client’s risk management operations; offer
human resources services; consult on matters such
as security policies and procedures; identify
weaknesses in security; provide security
technologies such as surveillance systems and
access control; introduce undercover agents into
the workforce; be responsible for conducting an
investigation when an offence takes place; and act
as a liaison between the client and state law
enforcement. They thus offer a security package to
their clients, fulfilling all of their security needs,
allowing clients to focus on their core business.
This sector has emerged because it is more cost-
effective and efficient for a company (e.g. a retailer)
to employ a contract security company to head in-
house operations and provide the knowledge and
technology required, than to employ their own staff
to perform this function. These service providers
have specialised skills, knowledge of the industry,
and contacts that are desired by clients.
In 2010 Jean-Pierre Nouveau conducted field
research for the purpose of completing a Masters
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As a result of this blurring, the functions
associated with contract security exist in the very
private, insulated sphere of in-house security.
Contract security, which has been the focus of
regulation, is concealed within the space/s of in-
house security, which, as mentioned, is largely
outside of the purview of the state, despite the
normative frameworks in place. This means that a
large part of the industry in practice operates
outside of state regulation or control and natural
(i.e. public) surveillance.  
Through missing a large part of the industry, the
current regulatory system does not reflect the
reality of the private security industry. However,
Nouveau’s research has shown that while the state
may be absent, the industry is not entirely
unregulated. We have used the concept of
regulation through association to describe this
form of regulation.32 Simply put, regulation
through association refers to the fact that future
business prospects are determined by the
relationships, resources and the reputation that
private security companies possess.  
Relationships exist between clients and security
companies, between different security companies,
and between police agents and security
companies, to name a few. Resources include the
services and technology available to a contract
security company as well as the contacts they
have that provide services and expertise such as
truth verification (for example, polygraph tests).
As for reputation, good relations with associates
will determine future employment. Ultimately, a
company has to consistently prove itself and
maintain a positive reputation with its clients. In
so doing it will become more attractive to
potential clients. These three factors in
combination determine a company’s associative
value. Companies associate themselves with the
strategic partners in order to secure business
opportunities for one another. Clients are often
known to one another, as well as to security
providers. The decision to align oneself with a
particular security provider is a crucial one, and
is linked to the services they provide and how
they conduct their activities. An intimate
association (for instance by means of a retainer)
dissertation. The study involved the observation of
and participation in an investigation into the theft
of a number of valuable products held within the
client’s warehouse by a syndicate consisting of staff
members of the client. This investigation was
conducted by contract security providers, and
involved polygraphers. The investigation resulted
in a disciplinary hearing by the client company,
and the crime was only later reported to the
police, once the investigation was completed.
Once the crime had been reported to the police
the security company also acted as liaison between
the client and the police and prosecutor, briefing
them on the investigation that took place as well
as providing them with the evidence that they had
accumulated, such as the results of polygraph tests
and formal statements. In addition to the
researcher’s observation during the investigation,
over the period of a year he also analysed the core
business functions of the client, and spent a
semester interning at the contract security
company that was employed by the client. 
Research has shown that ‘in-house security’ still
largely remains outside of the purview of the
state.30 The same is true for contract security; yet,
contract security companies increasingly act as if
they were part of the businesses they are con-
tracted to provide services to. This has
contributed to a blurring of the functions of the
in-house security sector and the contract security
sector. 
While in the past a client’s in-house security
unit/branch would have been responsible for
internal investigations, companies now contract
private security providers to conduct the
investigations for them.31 In addition, undercover
agents employed and governed by contract
security companies are contracted to the client to
provide in-house security. In such cases the
contract security company is responsible for
training and vetting the agents and paying them a
set basic salary for their work under cover. In
addition the client pays them for the specific work
they are doing while they are under cover, as per
the normal wages of employees in their position.
They are therefore both agents of the contract
security company and the client company.  
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with key clients lends desirability to particular
security providers; that is, they have a high
associative value. In this way private security
companies are held accountable by other players
within the industry. This is a mutually beneficial
act of symbiosis. Crucially, this has the
consequence of keeping out the fly-by-night
security providers, by starving them of work.
Thus the novelty and advantage of regulation
through association is its capacity to introduce
social, moral, and personal dynamics into the
arena of regulation.  
Nouveau’s research has also shown that security
providers form selective associations according to
their interests and are free from external
regulatory tools, such as codes of conduct. The
problem is that these networks of associations are
not necessarily legitimate, nor do they necessarily
operate within the confines of the law.  Some
clients may require that security providers act
within the law, while others turn a blind eye to
unlawful activities, as these may be what they
require. This may include the use of ‘old boy’
networks to acquire privileged information.33
Moreover, these associations may exist in the
absence of a contract. As such, behaviour is
regulated by the requirements of the association
rather than through contracts, laws or codes of
conduct.
Association seems to be an important element of
regulating the industry, and in one respect the
network of associations acts as a regulatory body.
Yet, this is not sufficient to ensure that these
companies comply with the law, or act in a way
that benefits society. It may be concluded that the
idea of a single entity that can act as an
overarching regulator is untenable.  
Criminal abuses
So far we have shown that the pluralisation of
policing and the complexity of the industry
present both challenges and opportunities for
conceiving of a new form of regulation. A third
issue, criminal abuse, needs to be considered
before we can move on to suggesting a new
approach. 
The private security industry (or at least sections
of it) can, in theory, threaten the security of
individuals – as demonstrated by the types of
incidents appearing in recent media reports and
high-profile court cases.34 This may be due to, for
instance: 
• the fact that private security guards are often 
the first line of defence for their clients and
may thus be confronted with potentially
violent situations 
• a large part of the industry is (heavily) armed – 
particularly armed response dealing with
emergency calls 
• the increased movement of private security 
into public spaces, as mentioned, means
greater interaction with the public 
• a large part of the activities of private security 
guards may take place outside the purview of
transparent, state oversight.  
This is compounded by the fact that very little is
known about the deaths and injuries caused by
people within the industry, except through a
review of court cases.35 Coupled with this is the
absence of analytical capacity. In other words,
there is no body or institution which regularly and
routinely analyses the nature of criminal abuses in
the industry to ascertain whether there are any
systemic problems within the industry itself that
need to be resolved.36 Incidents of criminality are
dealt with either internally or through court cases
(but not necessarily so), on an ad hoc basis.  
The root of the problem is the fact that the current
regulatory system, and specifically PSIRA, is, in
practice, ‘a business regulation model rather than a
model of public service governance’.37 Although
the legislation provides for peace officer status and
confers a number of powers on inspectors, the
reality is that inspections focus on the business
aspects of regulation, while criminal cases are
referred to the SAPS.
…what we [PSIRA] do is we randomly select
companies where we go do inspections or we go
specifically in terms of a plan.  We check the
name list to see whether the people are
registered, trained, whether they are paid the
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correct allowances like […] Sunday time, etc.
Those types of normal things. … but we don’t
really get involved in criminal issues as such.38
In other words, PSIRA deals with such things as
licensing, certification and minimum standard
setting, but is not equipped to deal with
criminality, episodes of violence, human rights
violations and the illicit use of firearms. Where
these incidents are identified, PSIRA’s powers are
limited to the issuing of a warning, suspension or
withdrawal of registration of the offending private
security company. In other words, PSIRA relies
on the SAPS to prosecute cases of abuse.39
CONCLUSION: TOWARDS A THIRD
PHASE OF REGULATION
The above three challenges – the increased
pluralisation of policing, the operation of hidden
sectors of the industry, and criminal abuses –
indicate the need to re-examine our current
(state) regulatory systems if we are to enter a third
phase of regulation that addresses these problems.
This requires innovation, recognising these and
other problems and conceiving of a system of
regulation that is a mix of regulatory techniques
and practices from both state and non-state
sources. A one-size-fits-all approach is not
sufficient.  
A business model of regulation, if implemented
well, can resolve a number of issues (with respect
to the rights of employees for instance), but falls
short if not supplemented by other techniques.
Regulation through association, as discussed
above, demonstrates that the private security
industry is an organic network of associations
that is constantly changing and evolving in
unpredictable ways. A centralised, hierarchical
approach to regulation cannot succeed if the aim
is to enter the regulatory space of the hidden
sector. If the state wished to make inroads into
regulating the hidden sector, it could enter into
the field of regulation, not as commanders, but as
an associate within the network of associations. It
would then need to form flexible and purposeful
associations with other consenting actors, in a
mutually beneficial and symbiotic manner. This
would be a form of circular regulation, which
could be supplemented by a vertical approach
(that is, a top-down legislative system of
regulation).40
The current state regulatory system also lacks a
system of accountability. That is not to say that the
industry is not accountable at all, since private
security can be ‘governed by and accountable to
different people/bodies for different aspects of
their work, at different times, and in different
ways.’41 In some ways private security may in
actual fact be more accountable than the state
police, but in other respects less accountable,
depending on who one is required to be
accountable to. A company may, for instance, be
accountable to its client but still operate on the
fringes of legality.
What is lacking is a way to ensure that private
security companies and their employees are held
accountable to the Constitution and to principles
of human rights. In order to do this it is necessary
to ask what accountability should entail. This
raises a number of important questions: For what
reasons should companies have to account for
their actions? For example, is it because of their
impact on public safety, or because of their
potential to hamper freedom of movement and
privacy? To whom should the company account?
Is it the state, the client, the public, parliament, or
all of these? For what actions should the company
have to account, and when? Before, during or after
an action for which they should be accountable?
How should they account? Through the
submission of information or written reports? And
to which level should they report: local, national,
regional – or all three?42
Not all sectors of the industry need to be subject
to the same systems of accountability, since some
sectors are involved in activities that may pose no
immediate threat to human rights or public safety.
This suggests the need for multiple levels or sites
of accountability, aimed primarily at the sectors
that have the potential for abuse. For this to
happen, both state and non-state players have to
be involved. The state may not necessarily have
the knowledge, power and capacity to fully and
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effectively regulate all and every aspect of the
industry, nor is it necessary that it does, if a multi-
faceted approach to regulation is adopted.43 This
is a conclusion that the state has at various stages
probably also reached, given the nature of the
regulatory system in place in the past and
present.44 So perhaps the path to a third phase is
already being paved. What remains is to find a
way to link state and non-state systems and/or
meta-regulate systems (to regulate the regulators)
already in place, and align them with the
Constitution.45
We would like to conclude with a proposal for a
different approach to regulating the private
security industry, which may also be relevant to
the regulation of policing in general. Given the
plurality of policing of public spaces, and in fact
in the private realm as well, perhaps there should
be a focus on the functions of policing rather than
only the institutions of policing. In this way,
instead of having discrete regulatory bodies for
each institution, one could have regulatory bodies
or even one overarching regulatory body with
representation from state and non-state
institutions, aimed at specific functions, no matter
who is engaged in this function.  
This is not a new idea. It stems from
recommendations made by the Independent
Commission on Policing in Northern Ireland
(known as the Patten Commission) on ways to
reform policing in Northern Ireland. One of the
recommendations was to create a Policing Board
responsible, amongst other things, for the
democratic accountability of all policing and
which would therefore go ‘beyond supervision of
the police service itself, extending to the wider
issues of policing and the contributions that
people and organizations other than the police
can make towards public safety.’46
It was proposed that this Board should consist of
state representatives but also representatives from
‘business, trade unions, voluntary individuals,
community groups and the legal profession.’47 It is
not difficult to imagine similar principles of
regulation and accountability finding expression
in the South African context. However, we need
to know more about the nature of policing, such
as the hidden sectors for instance, to be able to
move into a third phase. We thus agree with
Clifford Shearing that one possible way to a third
phase of regulation would be to establish a
Policing Commission to fully investigate the
nature of policing in its entirety in South Africa
and propose a practical way forward for effective,
innovative regulation.48
To comment on this article visit
http://www.issafrica.org/sacq.php
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